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1. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, the non-cooperative approach to coalition formation has
been adopted to analyse various economic problems (cf. Bloch, 1997;
Carraro and Marchiori, 2002; Konishi et al., 1997; Ray and Vohra, 1996,
1997; Yi, 1997). When applying theoretical results on coalition formation
to the provision of public goods – and in particular to global environmen-
tal agreements – the conclusion is often that no coalition forms at the equi-
librium and that, if a non-trivial equilibrium coalition emerges, it is formed
by a small number of players (Hoel, 1991, 1992; Carraro and Siniscalco,
1993; Barrett, 1994, 1997; Heal, 1994). This result is the consequence of the
presence of strong free-riding incentives that become even stronger in the
presence of leakage (that is, when reaction functions are non-orthogonal;
cf. Carraro and Siniscalco, 1993).
Diﬀerent policy strategies have been proposed to increase the number of
players who decide to join the equilibrium coalition. Transfers and issue
linkage are probably the most popular proposed strategies, even though
negotiation rules and treaty design can also be used to achieve equilibria in
which large-sized coalitions form at the equilibrium (cf. Carraro, 2001).
In this chapter, we focus on issue linkage. The basic idea of issue linkage
is to design a negotiation framework in which countries do not negotiate
only on one issue (for instance, the environmental issue), but force them-
selves to negotiate on two joint issues (for example, the environmental and
another interrelated economic issue).
Pioneering contributions on issue linkage are those by Tollison and
Willett (1979) and Sebenius (1983). They propose this mechanism to
promote cooperation not only on environmental matters, but also on other
issues, for example, security and international ﬁnance. They also emphasise
the increase in transaction costs that can result from the use of issue linkage.
Issue linkage was introduced into the economic literature on interna-
tional environmental cooperation by Folmer et al. (1993) and by Cesar and
65
De Zeeuw (1996) to solve the problem of asymmetries among countries.
The intuition is simple: if some countries gain from cooperating on a given
economic issue whereas other countries gain from cooperating on another,
by linking the two issues it may be possible to obtain an agreement that is
proﬁtable to all countries.
Issue linkage can also be used to mitigate the problem of free-riding. To
do this, negotiations that are aﬀected by free-riding – that is, negotiations
concerning public goods – must be linked with negotiations on club or
quasi-club goods. The intuition is that the incentives to free-ride on the
non-excludable beneﬁts of public good provision can be oﬀset by the incen-
tives to appropriate the excludable beneﬁts coming from providing the club
good.
To address the free-riding problem, Barrett (1995, 1997) proposes linking
environmental protection to negotiations on trade liberalisation. In this
way, potential free-riders are deterred with threats of trade sanctions. In
Carraro and Siniscalco (1995, 1997) and Katsoulacos (1997), environmen-
tal cooperation is linked to cooperation in research and development
(R&D). If a country does not cooperate on the control of the environment,
it loses the beneﬁts of technological cooperation. An empirical analysis of
this type of issue linkage in the case of climate negotiations is contained in
Buchner et al. (2002). Finally, Mohr (1995) and Mohr and Thomas (1998)
propose linking climate negotiations to international debt swaps.
These contributions show the eﬀectiveness of linkage in increasing the
equilibrium number of cooperators on the provision of public goods, but
do not investigate the forces which determine the number of issues which
could be optimally linked and the related size of the equilibrium coalition
(that is, the number of players/countries who cooperate on the linked
issues). In a recent work, Alesina et al. (2001) extend the analysis of the
eﬀectiveness of issue linkage to the case of heterogeneous countries. One of
the most interesting results of their paper is the identiﬁcation of a trade-oﬀ
between the size and the scope of a coalition: a coalition where countries
cooperate on too many issues may be formed by a few countries, which
implies small spillovers among them, whereas coalitions in which coopera-
tion is restricted to few issues may be joined by many countries, thus raising
many positive externalities within the coalition. However, the work by
Alesina et al. (2001) assumes away the existence of free-riding incentives,
which are instead one of the crucial features of the game analysed in this
chapter.
In this chapter, we focus on coalitions which can cooperate on at most
two issues. The goal of this chapter is neither to check the eﬀectiveness of
issue linkage in increasing the number of cooperating countries, nor to
identify the number of economic issues that can be optimally linked.
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Instead, the goal here is to analyse whether issue linkage belongs to the
equilibrium of the game when issue linkage is not exogenously assumed,
but players can decide whether or not to link two economic issues on which
they know they will have to negotiate.
Let us consider an example. In the case of global environmental issues,
incentives to free-ride on emission abatement are strong and cooperation is
unlikely. In addition, there is no supra-national authority that can impose
the adoption of issue linkage. Negotiating countries therefore decide inde-
pendently whether or not to link the negotiation on a global environmen-
tal problem to the negotiation on a diﬀerent economic issue. This decision
is a strategic choice that players make. A game therefore describes the
incentives to link the two issues. This game is also characterised by free-
riding incentives. The reason for this is that issue linkage may indeed
increase the number of cooperators on the provision of a global environ-
mental good; however, at the same time, issue linkage may reduce the
number of cooperators on the second issue (the one linked to the provision
of the global environmental good). Hence, even if issue linkage increases
the number of signatories – and therefore the amount of global environ-
mental good provided – it may not be an equilibrium outcome.
The crucial question is therefore the following: do players have an incen-
tive to link the negotiations on two diﬀerent issues instead of negotiating
on the two issues separately? Is the choice of issue linkage an equilibrium
of the game in which players decide non-cooperatively whether or not to
link the negotiations on two diﬀerent economic issues?
This chapter answers the above questions by analysing a three-stage non-
cooperative sequential game. In the ﬁrst stage, players decide whether or
not to link the negotiations on two issues on which they are trying to reach
an agreement. If they decide not to link the two issues, in the second stage
they decide whether or not to sign either one or both separate agreements.
If they decide in favour of issue linkage, in the second stage they decide
whether or not to sign the linked agreement. Finally, in the third stage they
set the value of their policy variables.
When analysing this game, two cases will be considered: one in which the
beneﬁts accruing to the signatories of one of the two separate agreements
are perfectly or almost perfectly excludable (cooperators provide a club
good), and one in which the degree of excludability is low.
Let us underline that the decision taken in the ﬁrst stage of the game is
analysed assuming the unanimity voting rule. Indeed, the choice of issue
linkage can be considered as a negotiation rule whose determination pre-
cedes the beginning of actual negotiations and which therefore should be
taken with the consensus of all countries involved in the negotiation process.
However, the extension to the case of majority voting is straightforward.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 2 introduces the basic
deﬁnitions and assumptions. Section 3 describes the diﬀerent cases in which
the game will be solved. Section 4 presents the equilibrium of the three-
stage game under diﬀerent degrees of excludability of the club good.
Finally, Section 5 discusses the main conclusions of our analysis, possible
extensions, and policy implications.
2. DEFINITIONS AND ASSUMPTIONS
Assume n players face the following situation: they decide to either link the
two negotiations or not to link them. If the two negotiations are not linked,
they subsequently decide whether or not to participate in the ﬁrst agree-
ment, or in the second agreement, or in both. If the two negotiations are
linked, they then decide whether or not to sign the linked agreement.
The game therefore has three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, the linkage game
takes place, where the n players decide simultaneously and non-
cooperatively whether or not to introduce a rule that forces all players to
negotiate on a single agreement in which the two issues are linked. In the
second stage, the coalition game, they decide simultaneously and non-
cooperatively whether or not to sign one of the available treaties (that is, to
join a coalition c of cooperating countries). In the third stage, they play the
non-cooperative Nash policy game, where players that signed the agreement
play as a single player and divide the resulting payoﬀ according to a given
burden-sharing rule (any of the rules derived from cooperative game
theory).
A few assumptions are necessary to simplify our analysis.
A.1 (Uniqueness): The third stage game, the policy game, in which all
players decide simultaneously, has a unique Nash equilibrium for any coali-
tion structure.1
A.2 (Cooperation): Inside each coalition, players act cooperatively in
order to maximise the coalitional surplus, whereas coalitions (and single-
tons) compete with one another in a non-cooperative way.
A.3 (Symmetry): All players are ex-ante identical, which means that each
player has the same strategy space in the second stage game.
Assumption A.3 allows us to adopt an equal sharing payoﬀ division rule
inside any coalition, that is, each player in a given coalition receives the
same payoﬀ as the other members of the coalition. Furthermore, the sym-
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metry assumption implies that a coalition can be identiﬁed with its size c.
As a consequence, the payoﬀ received by the players only depends on the
coalition sizes and not on the identity of the coalition members.
Given the above assumptions, a per-member partition function (parti-
tion function hereafter) can be deﬁned. It can be denoted by p(c; ), which
represents the payoﬀ of a player belonging to the size-c coalition in the
coalition structure . Let {(r), (s), ...} be a coalition structure formed
by r size- coalitions, s size- coalitions, etc.
A.4 (Issues): Negotiations take place on two, exogenously given, issues
(called ‘a’ and ‘t’ in this chapter). Therefore, there is no trade-oﬀ between
the size and scope of a coalition.
A.5 (Single coalition): Players are proposed to sign a single agreement.
Hence, those who do not sign the agreement cannot propose a diﬀerent one.
From a game-theoretic viewpoint, this implies that only one coalition can
be formed, the defecting players playing as singletons. Hence {c, 1(nc)},
where 1{nc} denotes the nc singletons, and the partition (payoﬀ) function
can simply be denoted by P(c).
A.6 (Open Membership): Each player is free to join and to leave the coali-
tion without the consensus of the other coalition members.
This assumption enables us to adopt the usual Nash equilibrium concept
to identify the equilibrium of the coalition game. Diﬀerent results could be
obtained under exclusive membership or coalition unanimity (cf. Carraro
and Marchiori, 2002).
Let us introduce a few deﬁnitions. Let cu
* denote the equilibrium number
of players who sign the linked agreement (that is, when issue linkage is
chosen in the ﬁrst stage of the game). Then Pu(cu
*) is their equilibrium
payoﬀ. The remaining ncu
* players are the free-riders of the linked agree-
ment. Their equilibrium payoﬀ is Qu(cu
*).
If linkage is not adopted, we have two agreements. Let ‘a’ identify the
agreement whose beneﬁts are not excludable (for instance, the environmen-
tal agreement), whereas ‘t’ identiﬁes the agreement with (partly) excludable
beneﬁts (for example, the agreement on technological cooperation). Then,
let ca
* be the equilibrium number of players who sign the public good agree-
ment, or ‘a-agreement’, whereas ct
* is the equilibrium number of signatories
of the (quasi) club good agreement, or ‘t-agreement’. Pa(ca
*) is the equilib-
rium payoﬀ of the former, whereas Pt(ct
*) is the equilibrium payoﬀ of the
latter. Finally, free-riders of the ‘a-agreement’ obtain a payoﬀ equal to
Qa(ca
*), whereas free-riders of the ‘t-agreement’ obtain Qt(ct
*).
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These deﬁnitions enable us to introduce another useful assumption:
A.7 (Additivity): Pu(c)Pa(c)Pt(c), c and Qu(c)Qa(c)Qt(c), c.
Hence, the payoﬀ that can be obtained from linking the two agreements is
equal to the sum of the payoﬀs of the two individual agreements, both for
cooperators in the joint agreement and for its free-riders.
Finally, under open membership (Assumption A.6), the following equi-
librium concept is adopted:
Equilibrium: A coalition c* is an equilibrium coalition if it is proﬁtable
and stable, where proﬁtability and stability are deﬁned as follows:
Proﬁtability: A coalition c* is proﬁtable if each cooperating player gets a
larger payoﬀ than the one he would get when no coalition forms. Formally:
P(c*)P(0) (3.1)
for all players in the coalition c*, 2c*n.2
Stability: A coalition formed by c* players is stable if on the one hand
there is no incentive to free-ride, that is:
Q(c*1)P(c*)0 (3.2a)
and on the other hand there is no incentive to broaden the coalition, that
is:
P(c*1)Q(c*)0 (3.2b)
Notice that, if a coalition c* is proﬁtable and stable, then no player has an
incentive to modify his decision to sign or not to sign the agreement. Hence,
c*, 2c*n, is the outcome of a Nash equilibrium in which each country’s
strategy set is {sign, not sign}.
In particular, cu
* identiﬁes the size of the equilibrium coalition when issue
linkage is adopted iﬀ:
Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*)Pa(0)Pt(0) (3.3a)
Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*)Qa(cu
*1)Qt(cu
*1) (3.3b)
Pa(cu
*1)Pt(cu
*1)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) (3.3c)
From (3.3a) it is clear that, if the two separate agreements are proﬁtable,
then the linked agreement is also proﬁtable. However, a linked agreement
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may be proﬁtable to all players even when the two separate agreements are
proﬁtable only to a fraction of the n players of the game (two diﬀerent frac-
tions for the two agreements). This is why, as explained in the introduction
to this chapter, issue linkage has been proposed to solve the proﬁtability
problem (cf. Cesar and De Zeeuw, 1996).
Let us deﬁne the structure and the payoﬀs of the linkage game. If players
decide to link the two issues and negotiate on a joint agreement, the equi-
librium payoﬀs are:
Pu(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*) (3.4a)
for a signatory of the agreement;
Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) (3.4b)
for a free-rider.
If instead players prefer not to link the two issues, they decide whether or
not to participate in two diﬀerent agreements. In this case, at the equilib-
rium they obtain the following payoﬀs:
Pa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) (3.5a)
if they decide to cooperate on both issues;
Pa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*) (3.5b)
if they cooperate in the ‘a-agreement’, but they free-ride on the ‘t-agreement’;
Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) (3.5c)
if they cooperate in the ‘t-agreement’, but free-ride on the other issue;
Qa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*) (3.5d)
if they free-ride on both issues. Hence, without linkage, there are four
‘types’ of countries, where the identity of the countries is irrelevant because
of symmetry. The structure of the game and its payoﬀs are summarised in
Figure 3.1.
Let us make two ﬁnal assumptions on how decisions are taken in the ﬁrst
stage of the game.
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A.8 (Voting): In the ﬁrst stage of the game, decisions are taken by unan-
imous agreement (players set a sort of constitutional rule).3
A.9 (Max-min strategy): In the ﬁrst stage of the game, a player selects
issue linkage only when the worst payoﬀ this choice provides is larger that
the one he would get without linkage under any strategy in the second stage
of the game (cooperator or non-cooperator, on one issue or two issues).
The idea is that a player votes in favour of linkage only if the worst payoﬀ
he gets when the issues are linked is larger than the best payoﬀ he can obtain
in the absence of linkage. The equilibrium conditions of the linkage game
are then easily obtained by comparing the payoﬀs summarised in Figure 3.1.
3. EXCLUDABLE BENEFITS AND PROFITABILITY
FUNCTIONS
Before deriving and discussing the conditions under which linking the
negotiations on the two economic issues is an equilibrium of the game pre-
sented in Section 2, it is important to introduce some additional elements
which characterise the structure of the game. As shown below, the equilib-
rium condition depends, among other things, on two features of the game:
● the degree of excludability of the beneﬁts arising from the agreement
(the ‘t-agreement’) which is linked to the environmental agreement
(the ‘a-agreement’);
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Figure 3.1 The structure of the game
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● the shape of the proﬁtability functions describing the gains achieved
by cooperators in the two separate agreements and in the linked
agreement.
Let us therefore characterise both the degree of excludability of coopera-
tion beneﬁts and the shape of the proﬁtability functions. Let us use the
example of R&D cooperation. In this case, the idea of issue linkage is to
link environmental cooperation, which provides non-excludable beneﬁts,
with R&D cooperation, which provides excludable, or at least partly
excludable, beneﬁts. In this way, the incentive to free-ride on environmen-
tal beneﬁts can be oﬀset by the incentive to appropriate the excludable
beneﬁts yielded by R&D cooperation.
It is well known that the degree of excludability of R&D and technologi-
cal innovation may not be perfect. Therefore, in this chapter we consider two
basic cases. In the ﬁrst, the beneﬁts from cooperation on the ‘t-agreement’ are
suﬃciently excludable to provide incentives for the formation of a grand
coalition on this agreement. In the second, a coalition smaller than the grand
coalition forms on the ‘t-agreement’, because beneﬁts from cooperation spill
over to the free-riders.
Let , [0,1], be the degree of excludability of the beneﬁts produced by
‘t-agreement’. If 1, then beneﬁts are perfectly excludable and they go only
to cooperators. Hence, Qt(ct)0, ct[2, n]. If 0, the beneﬁts produced
by cooperators are a public good and go to free-riders as well. In the case of
R&D cooperation,  depends on the possibility of patenting innovations and
on the duration and extension of the patent. If 01, then we have a case
of partial excludability. The smaller , the larger the beneﬁts achieved by
free-riders and hence the larger the function Qt(ct) for any given ct.
Let ° denote the value of  such that Pt(c
*
t)Qt(c
*
t1) when c
*
tn. In
words, when °, the degree of excludability is so high that the beneﬁts
from participating in the agreement are larger than the beneﬁts from free-
riding for all 2ctn. As a consequence, in this case, if the proﬁtability
condition is satisﬁed for all ct in the interval [2, n], then the grand coalition
forms, that is, all players prefer to sign the ‘t-agreement’ (c*tn).
4 By con-
trast, when °, only a partial coalition forms on the ‘t-issue’, that is, only
a subset of countries sign the ‘t-agreement’. The function Qt(ct) for low ,
° and high  is represented in Figure 3.2.
In the rest of the chapter we will analyse two cases:
Case A: °1, that is, the case in which all players would like to sign
the ‘t-agreement’ (c*tn);
Case B: 0°, that is, in the case of the ‘t-agreement’ a partial coalition
forms (2c*tn).
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As for the shape of the proﬁtability functions, the following assumption
will be used:
A.10 (Incomplete monotonicity): The payoﬀ functions Pa(ca), Qa(ca), and
Qt(ct) are assumed to be monotonically increasing in ca and ct respectively.
The payoﬀ function Pt(ct) is assumed to be increasing in ct for ctct° and
monotonically decreasing in ct for ctct°.
The monotonicity of Pa(ca), Qa(ca), and Qt(ct) is a standard assumption in
the economic literature on environmental coalition formation (see the
surveys by Barrett, 1997; Carraro, 1998; Carraro and Marchiori, 2002). In
particular, a monotonic Pa(ca) implies that the beneﬁts from providing a
public good (for example, from abating emissions) increase with the
number of countries that participate in the agreement.
As for the payoﬀ function Pt(ct), we assume that it initially increases with
the size of the coalition c and then it decreases (it is hump-shaped). As
shown in Carraro and Siniscalco (1997), this is actually the case when the
‘t-agreement’ concerns R&D cooperation and this is generally the case
when beneﬁts from cooperation are (partly) excludable. In the case of R&D
cooperation, the intuition is as follows. The decision to sign the R&D agree-
ment has two positive eﬀects for signatories: on the one hand, production
costs decrease because cooperative R&D makes more eﬃcient technologies
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Figure 3.2 Payoﬀ functions for diﬀerent values of 
Qt(c – 1) for low γ
Pt(c)
Qt(c – 1)
for γ = γ°
Qt(c – 1) for high γ
Pt(c)
Qt(c)
cn
available; on the other hand, market share increases because ﬁrms with
lower costs have a higher market share (a standard Cournot oligopoly is
assumed). However, this latter eﬀect becomes smaller and smaller as the
coalition size increases and goes to zero when ctn. Hence, the beneﬁt from
belonging to the coalition ct decreases with the size of ct when ct is above a
given intermediate value ct°.
Notice that, in Case A, if Pt(c
*
t) is hump-shaped, then Pt(c
*
tn)
Pt(c
*
t1). Moreover, at the equilibrium Pt(c
*
tn)Qt(c
*
t1). We also
assume for simplicity that, in case A, Pt(c
*
t1)Qt(ct
*n). Hence, Qt(c
*
t)
Pt(c
*
t).
The shape of the payoﬀ functions for cooperators and free-riders is
shown in Figure 3.3 for Case A (°1) and in Figure 3.4 for Case B
(0°).
Notice that in Figures 3.3 and 3.4 we represent the case in which ca
*c*t.
This reﬂects the implicit assumption that the equilibrium coalition in the
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Figure 3.3 Shape of the payoﬀ functions in Case A (°1)
P, Q
Pa(c)Qa(c – 1)
nca* c
P, Q Pt(c) Qt(c – 1)
ct* = n c
Figure 3.4 Shape of the payoﬀ functions in Case B (0°)
P, Q
Pa(c)
Qa(c – 1)
nca* c
P, Q
Pt(c)
Qt(c – 1)
ct* c
Qt(c – 1, γ°)
n
case of an agreement on a public good is smaller than the equilibrium coali-
tion in the case of an agreement on a (quasi) club good. Indeed, where ca
*
ct
*, the idea of linking the negotiation on the provision of a public good
to a diﬀerent negotiation would be meaningless.
Also notice that the monotonicity of Qa(c) and Qt(c) implies the mono-
tonicity of Qu(c). By contrast, Pu(c)Pa(c)Pt(c) can be both monotonic
or hump-shaped. However, given Assumption A.10, if Pu(c) is hump-
shaped, it is monotonically increasing for cuc°u and monotonically
decreasing for cuc°u, with c°uc°t .
In order to concentrate on the free-riding problem, let us assume that (i)
issue linkage actually increases the number of players who provide the
public good, that is:
cu
*ca
* (3.6a)
and (ii) issue linkage is proﬁtable:
Pu(cu
*)Pu(0) (3.6b)
Therefore, let us focus on the stability of the linked agreement. First, we
show that cu
* is smaller than ct
*, namely that the equilibrium coalition emerg-
ing from the linked negotiation is always smaller than the equilibrium coali-
tion in the ‘t-agreement’.5
Proposition 1: At the equilibrium, cu
*ct
*, that is, the number of players who
participate in the linked agreement is always smaller than or equal to the
number of players who participate in the (club good) agreement linked to the
public good agreement.
Proof: The linked agreement is internally stable if Pu(cu
*)Qu(cu
*1), that
is, if:
Qa(cu
*1)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*1) (3.7)
When cu
*ca
*, the left-hand side of (3.7) is positive because there is an incen-
tive to free-ride on the ‘a-agreement’ for all cca
*. This implies that the
right-hand side is also positive, that is, Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*1). Therefore, as far
as the ‘t-agreement’ is concerned, there is still an incentive to enter the coali-
tion. Hence, cu
* must be smaller than or equal to the equilibrium coalition
size ct
*, that is, cu
*ct
*.
The conclusion shown by Proposition 1 holds both in Case A and in Case
B. The only diﬀerence is that, in Case A, Pt(c)Qt(c1) is non-negative for
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Figure 3.5 Payoﬀ functions for the linked and separate agreements in
Case A and cu*cu°
c
Pu(cu)
c
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Figure 3.6 Payoﬀ functions for the linked and separate agreements in
Case B
Pu(c)
c
Pu(c)
Qu(c – 1)
Qu(c – 1)
Qt(c – 1)Pa(c)Qa(c – 1)
ct* ncu°ct°
ct*cu*cu°
ca*
P(c)
Q(c – 1)
Pt(c)
all c in the interval [2, n] because this is the condition which implies ct
*n.
Hence, Pt(c)Qt(c1) is obviously non-negative also for ccu
*. Note that
Proposition 1 and the preceding analysis lead to the following ordering:
ca
*cu
*ct
* and c°t c°u . (3.8)
The payoﬀ functions of the two separate games and of the linked game are
shown in Figures 3.5 and 3.6 for Cases A and B respectively. Both ﬁgures
deal with the situation in which cu
*c°u. These ﬁgures will be useful to clarify
the analysis of the equilibrium of the game.
4. THE EQUILIBRIUM OF THE GAME
4.1 Case A: Linkage with a Perfect Club Good
We are now ready to determine players’ equilibrium choice in the ﬁrst stage
of the game. In Case A, the situation is simpler, because, if players nego-
tiate only on the ‘t-agreement’, at the equilibrium all countries would like
to sign it (ct
*n). Hence, if players disagree on linkage, either they cooper-
ate on both the ‘a-agreement’ and the ‘t-agreement’, or they free-ride only
on the ﬁrst one. Their payoﬀ is therefore Pa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) or Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*),
where Pa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*)Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) because the monotonicity of Pa(ca)
and conditions (3.2a) and (3.2b) imply Pa(ca
*)Qa(ca
*). As a consequence:
Proposition 2: Assume A.1 to A.10 hold and °1, that is, ct
*n. If (i)
Pu(cu) is monotonic in the interval [2, n]; or (ii) cu
*c°u ; or (iii) cu
*c°u ,
c°un, and Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) is smaller than Qa(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)0, then players
adopt issue linkage under unanimity voting if:
[Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Pt(ct
*n)Pt(cu
*)] (3.9)
If instead (iv) cu
*c°u , c°un and Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) is positive and larger than
Qa(cu
*)Pa(cu
*); or (v) cu
*nc°u, the condition for players to adopt issue
linkage becomes:
[Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Pt(ct
*n)Qt(cu
*)] (3.10)
Proof: If Pu(cu) is monotonic or Pu(cu) is hump-shaped with cu
*c°u, then at
the equilibrium Pu(cu
*1)Pu(cu
*), which implies Pu(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*)
Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) because of (3.2a) and (3.2b). Hence, all players vote
for issue linkage if Pu(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*) – the worst payoﬀ they can get
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under issue linkage – is larger than Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) – the largest payoﬀ they
get without linkage. Hence, (3.9) must hold. If Pu(cu) is hump-shaped with
cu
*c°u , c°un, then Qu(cu
*) may be smaller than Pu(cu
*). If not, (3.9) holds
again. Qu(cu
*) is smaller than Pu(cu
*) if Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Pa(cu
*).
Notice that Qa(cu)Pa(cu)0 at ccu
*, because ca
*cu
*. Hence, a necessary
condition for Qu(cu
*)Pu(cu
*) is Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)0, which holds because cu
*
ct
*. As a consequence, if Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)0, all players
vote in favour of issue linkage when Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) – the worst
payoﬀ they can get under issue linkage – is larger than Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) – the
largest payoﬀ they get without linkage. Hence, (3.10) must hold. Finally,
when cu
*n, there is no incentive to defect for any cun. Hence, Pu(cu
*)
Pt(cu
*1)Qu(cu
*). As a consequence, Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) must be
larger than Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*), that is, (3.10) must hold (Q.E.D.).
How can conditions (3.9) and (3.10) be interpreted? [Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)] – the
left-hand side of (3.9) – represents the gain or loss that a free-rider on the
‘a-agreement’ achieves from joining the expanded coalition. It can also be
written as [Pa(cu
*)Pa(ca
*)][Qa(ca
*)Pa(ca
*)], where the ﬁrst term is the
increased gain that a cooperator on the ‘a-agreement’ achieves from
expanding the coalition, whereas the second term is a free-rider’s relative
gain when a coalition ca
* forms. [Pt(ct
*)Pt(cu
*)] is the possible gain or loss
that goes to a cooperator in the ‘t-agreement’ when the coalition size moves
from ct
* to cu
*. Hence, (3.9) says that the gain (loss) that a free-rider on the
‘a-agreement’ achieves from joining the expanded coalition must be larger
(smaller) than the gain (loss) that goes to a cooperator in the ‘t-agreement’
when the coalition size moves from ct
* to cu
*.
Condition (10) has a diﬀerent interpretation. [Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)] is the gain
that goes to a free-rider when more players cooperate on the provision of a
public good. [Pt(ct
*)Qt(cu
*)][Pt(ct
*)Pt(cu
*)][Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)] is the pos-
sible gain or loss that goes to a cooperator in the ‘t-agreement’ when the
coalition size moves from ct
* to cu
* , plus the excess beneﬁts of cooperation
when cu
*ct
* (recall that Pt(c)Qt(c) for all cct
*n, because the agreement
concerns a perfect club good). Hence, issue linkage is chosen by all players
if the gain that goes to a free-rider when more players cooperate in the provi-
sion of a public good is larger than the excess beneﬁts of cooperation when
cu
*ct
* plus the gain (loss) that goes to a cooperator in the ‘t-agreement’ when
the coalition size moves from ct
* to cu
*.
4.2 Case B: Linkage with an Imperfect Club Good
Let us now consider the second case, in which the club good issue linked to
the public good issue is an imperfect club good. This implies that the
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beneﬁts from cooperation on the ‘t-agreement’ which spill over to free-
riders are strong enough to induce some players not to join the coalition.
Hence, when players negotiate on the ‘t-agreement’ only, the equilibrium
coalition ct
* is not the grand coalition, that is, ct
*n.
In this context, it is still important to adopt issue linkage as a strategy to
increase the coalition size on the ‘a-agreement’ because ca
*ct
*. Hence, issue
linkage helps players to achieve a coalition cu
* larger than ca
*, but smaller
than ct
* (Proposition 1). However, the beneﬁts of a larger coalition on the
‘a-agreement’ must be traded oﬀ with the loss of a smaller coalition in the
‘t-agreement’.
The ﬁrst step to determine the equilibrium of the game is the analysis of
the payoﬀs of the four types of players that emerge in the second stage of
the game. We need to compare:
● Pa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*), the payoﬀ of a cooperator in both separate agree-
ments;
● Pa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*), the payoﬀ of a player who cooperates in the ‘a-
agreement’ but free-rides on the other one;
● Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*), the payoﬀ of a player who cooperates in the ‘t-
agreement’ but free-rides on the other one;
● Qa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*), the payoﬀ of a free-rider on both separate agreements.
First, notice that Pa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*)Qa(ca
*)Pt(ct
*) and Pa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*)
Qa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*) because the monotonicity of Pa(c) implies Pa(ca
*)Qa(ca
*).
Hence, the largest payoﬀ in the case of two separate agreements is the one
in which a player free-rides on both agreements iﬀ:
Pt(ct
*)Qt(ct
*) (3.11)
In the rest of this chapter we will use (3.11), which says that a free-rider on
the ‘t-agreement’ achieves a larger payoﬀ than a cooperator in the same
agreement. This is reasonable if the degree of appropriability of the
beneﬁts from cooperation in the ‘t-agreement’ is suﬃciently low. We assume
that this is the case for °.
Then, the conditions for issue linkage to be an equilibrium strategy are
described by the following Proposition:
Proposition 3: Assume A.1 to A.10 hold, 0°, that is, ct
*n, and
Pt(ct
*)Qt(ct
*). If (i) Pu(cu) is monotonic in the interval [2, n]; or (ii) cu
*
cu°; or (iii) cu
*cu° , cu°n, and Pt(cu
*) – Qt(cu
*) is smaller than Qa(cu
*)
Pa(cu
*)0, then players adopt issue linkage under unanimity voting iﬀ condi-
tion (3.12) holds, that is:
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[Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Qt(ct
*)–Pt(cu
*)] (3.12)
If cu
*c°u , c°un, and Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) is positive and larger than Qa(cu
*)
Pa(cu
*), the condition for issue linkage to be adopted becomes:
[Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Qt(ct
*)Qt(cu
*)] (3.13)
Proof: If Pu(cu) is monotonic or Pu(cu) is hump-shaped with cu
*cu°, then
at the equilibrium Pu(cu
*1)Pu(cu
*), which implies Pu(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*)
Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Qt(cu
*) because of (3.2a and 3.2b). Hence, all players
vote for issue linkage if Pu(cu
*)Pa(cu
*)Pt(cu
*) – the worst payoﬀ they can
get under issue linkage – is larger than Qa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*) – the largest payoﬀ
they get without linkage. Hence, (3.12) must hold.
If Pu(cu) is hump-shaped with cu
*c°u , c°un, then Qu(cu
*) may be smaller
than Pu(cu
*). If not, (3.12) holds again. Qu(cu
*) is smaller than Pu(cu
*) if Pt(cu
*)
Qt(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)Pa(cu
*). Notice that Qa(cu)Pa(cu)0 at ccu
*, because
ca
*cu
*. Hence, a necessary condition for Qu(cu
*)Pu(cu
*) is Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)
0, which holds for cu
*ct
*. As a consequence, if Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)
Pa(cu
*)0, all players vote in favour of issue linkage when Qu(cu
*)Qa(cu
*)
Qt(cu
*) – the worst payoﬀ they can get under issue linkage – is larger than
Qa(ca
*)Qt(ct
*) – the largest payoﬀ they get without linkage. Hence, (3.13)
must hold (Q.E.D.).
The interpretation of this Proposition goes as follows. Again we have two
conditions for issue linkage to be chosen by all players in the ﬁrst stage of
the game. Consider the ﬁrst one. The right hand side of (3.12) – [Qt(ct
*)
Pt(cu
*)] – is the loss from reducing the coalition on the ‘t-agreement’ from ct
*
to cu
* (Proposition 1 has shown that ct
*cu
*). This loss can be written as
Qt(ct
*)Pt(cu
*)[Qt(ct
*)Qt(cu
*)] [Pt(cu
*)Qt(cu
*)] where the ﬁrst term rep-
resents a free-rider’s loss when they get fewer beneﬁts from a smaller coali-
tion, whereas the second term represents the excess beneﬁt of cooperation
when cu
*ct
*.
The left-hand side of (3.12) is the same as the left-hand side of (3.9).
Hence, it represents the gain or loss which a free-rider on the ‘a-agreement’
achieves when joining the expanded coalition. It can also be written as
[Pa(cu
*)Pa(ca
*)] [Qa(ca
*)Pa(ca
*)]. The positivity of Qt(ct
*)Pt(cu
*) implies
that (3.12) holds if Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*) is also positive, that is, if the increased
gain which a cooperator on the ‘a-agreement’ achieves from expanding the
coalition is larger than a free-rider’s relative gain when a coalition ca
* forms.
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This is only a necessary condition. The suﬃcient condition says that the
increased gain which a cooperator on the ‘a-agreement’ (for example, a sig-
natory of an environmental agreement) achieves from expanding the coalition
from ca
* to cu
*, plus the excess beneﬁt of cooperation on the ‘t-agreement’ when
cu
*ct
*, must be larger than a free-rider’s relative gain when a coalition ca
*
forms plus the loss that a free-rider suﬀers because of the smaller spillovers
from the reduced cooperation on the ‘t-agreement’.
The second condition – the inequality (3.13) – is new and says that
the beneﬁts enjoyed by a free-rider on the ‘a-agreement’ when the coalition
size increases must be larger than the loss suﬀered by a free-rider on the ‘t-
agreement’ when the number of signatories of the ‘t-agreement’ decrease
from ct
* to cu
* (recall that beneﬁts from cooperation spill over to free-riders
in the case of the ‘t-agreement’ also).
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The previous section has identiﬁed four conditions under which all players
of the game prefer to negotiate on two linked issues rather than on the two
issues separately. In order to simplify the message which can be derived
from Propositions 2 and 3, let us assume that free-riders on the linked
agreement are better oﬀ than cooperators [Pu(cu
*)Qu(cu
*)]. This is the
most frequent case in coalition theory. Then, issue linkage is the equilib-
rium strategy under unanimity voting if:
[Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Qt(ct
*)Pt(cu
*)]
in the case of an imperfect club good (ct
*n), or
[Pa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Pt(ct
*n)Pt(cu
*)]
in the case of a perfect club good (ct
*n).
What policy message can be derived from these inequalities? First, let us
underline a necessary condition for issue linkage to be adopted in the ﬁrst
stage of the game. A free-rider on the public good agreement who enters
the coalition on the linked agreement must get a higher payoﬀ [Pa(cu
*)
Qa(ca
*)]. This is a prerequisite without which issue linkage is not chosen.
Hence, public good (for example, environmental) beneﬁts provided by a
larger coalition must be perceived as suﬃciently large.
Then, there is the necessary and suﬃcient condition. A free-rider on the
public good agreement who enters the coalition on the linked agreement
must not only increase his payoﬀ, but this positive change must be larger
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than the loss a player may suﬀer because the club good coalition becomes
smaller, (this is particularly clear in condition (3.9) but it is also true in
(3.12).
This highlights the trade-oﬀ that players face when deciding whether or
not to adopt issue linkage. Consider again the example of an environmen-
tal negotiation linked to a negotiation on R&D cooperation. On the one
hand, players would like to reap the beneﬁts provided by a larger environ-
mental coalition. On the other hand, they know that though issue linkage
increases the number of environmental cooperators, it also decreases the
participants in the R&D cooperation agreement. Hence, environmental
beneﬁts could be oﬀset by technological losses.
A similar argument holds when free-riders on the linked agreement are
worse oﬀ than cooperators [Pu(cu
*)Qu(cu
*)]. In this case the conditions for
issue linkage to be adopted under unanimity voting are:
[Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Qt(ct
*)Qt(cu
*)]
in the case of an imperfect club good (ct
*n), or
[Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)][Pt(ct
*n)Qt(cu
*)]
in the case of a perfect club good (ct
*n).
There is no necessary condition to be stressed, because the monotonic-
ity of Qa(ca) implies Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*). The necessary and suﬃcient condition
says that the gain [Qa(cu
*)Qa(ca
*)] that a free-rider achieves when free-
riding on a larger public good agreement must be larger than the loss a
player may suﬀer because the club good coalition becomes smaller.
As a consequence, when proposing or advocating issue linkage, policy-
makers must be careful in assessing two crucial elements. The ﬁrst crucial
element is the relative change of the coalition sizes cu
*ca
* and ct
*cu
*. The
greater cu
*ca
* and the smaller ct
*cu
*, the larger the likelihood that condi-
tions (3.12) (or (3.9)) and (3.13) (or (3.10)) be satisﬁed. The second crucial
element is the relative change in the players’ payoﬀs. The greater the
increased beneﬁts induced by greater cooperation on the public good issue,
the greater the likelihood that issue linkage be adopted. Similarly, the
smaller the loss from a reduced cooperation on the ‘t-agreement’, the
greater the likelihood that issue linkage be adopted.
Notice that these conditions neglect the likely increase of transaction
costs when negotiating on two linked issues. However, introducing transac-
tion costs would be trivial. They would simply be added to the right-hand
side of conditions (3.12), (3.9), (3.13) and (3.10).
Finally, let us note that all equilibrium conditions become less restrictive
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in the presence of majority voting and when the degree of excludability of
technological beneﬁts is high ( is large).
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1. See Carraro and Marchiori (2002) for an explanation of this and the following assump-
tions.
2. In the case of symmetric countries, this condition is fairly trivial: it simply means that a
country’s choice must be rational and that, if a coalition is proﬁtable for one country, it is
proﬁtable for all other ones.
3. The extension of our results to the case in which ﬁrst-stage decisions are taken with major-
ity voting is straightforward.
4. Notice that, when °, all coalitions ct where 2ctn satisfy the internal stability con-
dition (3.2a), but not the external stability condition (3.2b). In this case, all players want
to join the coalition. Hence, we assume that the equilibrium is achieved when ctn.
5. A similar result is also obtained in Alesina et al. (2001).
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